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THE ROBING ROOM
where judges are judged
Hon. Jesus G. Bernal
District judge
C.D.Cal.
9th Circuit
Average Rating:
7
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2
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Ratings:
What others have rated
Hon. Jesus G. Bernal
evaluator
ID
date
Temp* Sch* Indu* Comp* Punct* Ev-Cv* Ev-Cr* Flex Bail Crim Settle Trial Sent Coop Average
Court Staff
33090
12/31/25
7
1
1
1
7
5
1
2
1
1
1
1
2
1
3.2857142857142856
Other
33040
1/25/25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Civil Litigation - Private
29733
1/3/18
7
7
7
7
7
7
0
7
0
0
7
0
0
0
7
Litigant
23949
1/2/16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
category average
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-
-
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Items marked with (*) are averaged into the displayed overall rating
Fam
Par
Qu-Arg
At-Arg
Sch
Cri
Civ
Lab
Imm
How familiar are you with the work of this judge? (1=Not at all familiar,10=Extremely familiar)
Participates in Oral Argument (1=Rarely,10=Always)
Quality of Questions During Oral Argument (1=Poor,10=Extremely insightful)
Attitude during oral argument (1=Consistently inappropriate,10=Consistently respectful)
Scholarship as reflected in Opinions (1=Poor,10=Outstanding)
General Inclination in Criminal Appeals (1=Strongly ProGovernment,10=Strongly ProDefense)
General Inclination in Civil Rights Appeals (1=Strongly Pro-Defendant,10=Strongly ProPlaintiff)
General Inclination in Labor Law Appeals (1=Strongly ProEmployee,10=Strongly ProEmployer)
General Inclination in Immigration Appeals (1=Strongly ProImmigrant,10=Strongly ProGov.)
evaluator
ID
date
Fam Par Qu-Arg At-Arg Sch Cri Civ Lab Imm
Court Staff
33090
12/31/25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Other
33040
1/25/25
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Civil Litigation - Private
29733
1/3/18
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
Litigant
23949
1/2/16
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
category average
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-
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-
-
-
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Non-lawyer Rating
(if applicable)
evaluator
ID
date
Rating
category average
-
Temp*
Sch*
Indu*
Comp*
Punct*
Ev-Cv*
Ev-Cr*
Flex
Bail
Crim
Settle
Trial
Sent
Coop
Temperament (1=Awful 10=Excellent)
Scholarship (1=Awful 10=Excellent)
Industriousness (1=Not at all industrious 10=Highly industrious)
Ability to Handle Complex Litigation (1=Awful 10=Excellent)
Punctuality (1=Chronically Late 10=Always on Time)
Evenhandedness in Civil Litigation (1=Demonstrates Bias 10=Entirely Evenhanded)
Evenhandedness in Criminal Litigation (1=Demonstrates Bias 10=Entirely Evenhanded)
Flexibility in Scheduling (1=Completely Inflexible 10=Very Flexible)
General Inclination Regarding Bail (1=Pro-Defense 10=Pro-Government)
General Inclination in Criminal Cases Pre-Trial (1=Pro-Defense 10=Pro-Government)
Involvement in Civil Settlement Discussions (1=Least Involved 10=Most Involved)
General Inclination in Criminal Cases Trial (1=Pro-Defense 10=Pro-Government)
General Inclination in Criminal Cases Sentencing (1=Pro-Defense 10=Pro-Government)
Typical Discount Off Guidelines for Cooperators (1=10% 10=100%)
comments1
Comments:
What others have said about
Hon. Jesus G. Bernal
comment #:
33092
rating:
1/6/26, 12:40 PM
Court Staff
comment #:
33090
rating:
3.2857142857142856
Case Observed:
United States v. Jason Cardiff
Case No. 5:23-cr-00021-JGB
United States District Court, Central District of California
This commentary is offered from the perspective of a member of the federal judiciary and is grounded in a single premise: adjudication must be anchored exclusively in law. Personal views of the parties, institutional sympathies, reputational considerations, or perceived equities external to the record have no legitimate place in judicial decision making. The role of the court is to apply governing law to established facts, faithfully and without reservation. Where structural or jurisdictional defects are credibly raised, they must be addressed directly, irrespective of consequence.
The present prosecution did not arise in isolation. It followed an earlier civil enforcement action brought by the Federal Trade Commission against Jason Cardiff, over which Judge Dolly M. Gee presided. In that civil matter, the Government alleged deficiencies relating to clinical substantiation and sought substantial monetary relief. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management, which clarified the limits of the FTC’s remedial authority, the civil case concluded without the relief initially sought, and control of the underlying business was returned to Mr. Cardiff pursuant to court order. Mr. Cardiff thereafter relocated abroad with court authorization, and for a period the matter appeared resolved in the ordinary course. The subsequent initiation of criminal proceedings, arising from substantially overlapping factual terrain, provides necessary context for understanding the procedural sensitivities now presented.
As a member of this narrow and collegial judicial fraternity, I periodically consult The Robing Room to understand how judicial conduct is perceived by the bar and by litigants. I do so not for commentary on personalities, but as a matter of institutional stewardship. Public confidence in the judiciary depends not merely upon outcomes, but upon visible adherence to first principles. Structural regularity, procedural fidelity, and respect for the limits of judicial and prosecutorial authority are indispensable to the rule of law.
I have followed the proceedings in United States v. Jason Cardiff with sustained and deliberate attention. Having reviewed the docket in full and examined the filings sequentially, as one would when assuming responsibility for a matter midstream, I can state candidly that it is rare to encounter a federal criminal case presenting such a concentration of unresolved threshold issues. The record reflects not a single aberration, but a series of foundational questions that remain outstanding.
The defendant has filed 6 motions to dismiss. Of these, at least 4 present substantial legal questions, and no fewer than 3 would, in my judgment, have warranted dismissal had they been presented to me. These motions are neither dilatory nor rhetorical. They are carefully framed, legally grounded, and directed at defects that ordinarily would be resolved at the outset of criminal proceedings. They implicate jurisdiction, authority, due process, and the lawful invocation of the sovereign’s prosecutorial power.
During the recent holiday recess, I revisited the docket and encountered a development of particular significance: the filing of a motion to strike. Such motions are uncommon in criminal practice and are often disfavored. Here, however, the motion is not collateral in nature. It is directed at a question antecedent to all others: whether the United States is lawfully represented in this prosecution.
The motion alleges, and the docket appears to corroborate, that the case has proceeded for an extended period without a duly appointed Assistant United States Attorney and, more strikingly, without a sitting United States Attorney for approximately 6 months. According to the record, the only individual purporting to act on behalf of the Government is a Department of Justice trial attorney from Washington, D.C., whose authority to prosecute this matter has not been established by any disclosed statutory delegation, appointment order, or written authorization filed with the court.
If accurate, this defect is not technical, incidental, or subject to harmless error analysis. It is jurisdictional in character. Acts taken ultra vires by an unauthorized representative of the sovereign are void ab initio. Proceedings conducted coram non judice cannot be cured by waiver, acquiescence, considerations of efficiency, or post hoc ratification. Authority must exist at the moment prosecutorial power is exercised.
To my knowledge, this posture is without precedent in modern federal criminal practice. I am unaware of any other federal prosecution that has proceeded for a sustained period in the absence of a United States Attorney, an Assistant United States Attorney of record, or a disclosed and valid statutory delegation authorizing a Department of Justice trial attorney to act in their stead. While courts occasionally encounter brief transitional gaps, the continuation of a criminal prosecution under these circumstances appears sui generis and presents questions of first impression concerning the limits of institutional tolerance for defects in prosecutorial authority.
What is taught at the outset of judicial service is unequivocal. Before addressing the merits of any dispute, before exercising discretion, and before ruling on any motion, the court must ascertain who appears before it and whether those persons possess lawful authority to do so. Identification of the prosecutor and confirmation of proper appointment and delegation are not procedural formalities. They are a sine qua non of criminal adjudication and a core safeguard of separation of powers.
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to avoid the question of how such a defect persisted unaddressed. How did a federal criminal case proceed for months without an AUSA of record? How were filings accepted and rulings issued without first resolving whether the United States was lawfully represented at all? These are matters ordinarily resolved sua sponte and at the threshold, precisely because they implicate the court’s own jurisdiction and institutional legitimacy.
These concerns are amplified by the presence of a fully developed fraud on the court motion supported by documentary evidence and sworn declarations, to which the Government has offered no substantive rebuttal on the issue of fraud itself. Fraud on the court is not an ordinary factual dispute between adversaries. It is an injury to the judicial process and is addressed through the court’s inherent authority to protect the integrity of its proceedings and records.
The decision to characterize such fraud as a matter for jury determination, rather than as a judicial question antecedent to trial, is highly unusual. Fraud on the court is not merely fraud inter partes; it is fraud directed at the tribunal. Deferring that determination raises serious institutional questions concerning the allocation of judicial responsibility and the court’s role as guardian of its own processes.
I offer no opinion on the ultimate disposition of this matter. That responsibility rests solely with Judge Bernal, and I do not minimize the difficulty of presiding over a case presenting this degree of procedural complexity. I note only that this case is being closely observed by those who understand, perhaps more acutely than most, what it means to occupy the federal bench. When unresolved questions of prosecutorial authority, prima facie fraud on the court, and jurisdictional infirmities converge in a single prosecution, the judiciary’s duty to address them decisively is at its zenith.
This case is no longer merely about a defendant or a single prosecution. It implicates the court’s obligation to ensure that the sovereign itself appears lawfully and that judicial power is exercised only within the bounds prescribed by law. How these issues are resolved will resonate well beyond this docket and will speak directly to the judiciary’s enduring role as guardian of its own legitim
12/31/25, 10:57 AM
Other
comment #:
33040
rating:
This fucking disgusting fuck is a lying degenerate piece of shit of a fucking judge. If he keeps playing about my fucking money it's gonna be some fucking problems. That fucking low gutter cunt bitch.
1/25/25, 6:25 AM
Civil Litigation - Private
comment #:
29733
rating:
7
Civil rights case against USA/Bivens Action. Started out on a very sour note when Judge Bernal dismissed the action- Ex Parte without notice or argument- on an alleged technicality. After getting the action reinstated Judge Bernal bent over backwards to give the Feds every opportunity possible. After the Feds/AUSA fumbled the ball on every down Judge Bernal saw the light (he had no other choice really) and knew there was only one way this game could end; Judge Bernal did what he was supposed to do as a 'referee' and made the right ruling, which was the ONLY legit ruling he could make based on the facts of the case. Like Chief Justice John Roberts said at his confirmation hearing, judges are just there to 'call balls and strikes' and ensure a fair playing field (OK, try not to laugh at that). In this action Judge Bernal was a very fair referee/umpire. Took some pushing and convincing to get him there, but he was fair today. 7/10 today, and I hope to raise Judge Bernal's average in future actions before him.
1/3/18, 4:01 AM
Litigant
comment #:
23949
rating:
0
This judge favors and has a history of favoring the rich and wealthy companies. His rulings are not just and fair, and he avoids commenting on matters and facts that show how unfair his decision is. He does not follow the law or common sense. Such judges should be stopped from practicing.
1/2/16, 6:21 AM
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