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THE ROBING ROOM
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Calculated on a minimum of five ratings
Calculated on a minimum of five ratings
Notable Comments
Latest Comments
Pseudo-intellectual jerk with life tenure.
Civil Litigation - Private
3/24/26
Judge Kenton defended me in 1983. I was living in DC and came to LA for the trial. Although we lost, served my sentence and returned to an academic career. He was a good lawyer.
Other
3/19/26
My personal opinion is that Mr. Judge Lafitte is a Crook, and for a variety of reasons personally known to me and attested by Members of the Legal Community. He was a nobody in the Legal Community, and his judgeship was just a reward from Mr. Governor Romero-Barceló for having destroyed the incriminating evidence in the case Cerro Maravilla. He brought a lot of disgrace to the Office of District Judge. A grandstanding Crook, and he knows it deep in his heart.
Litigant
3/18/26
Very hard working and fair judge who treats everyone with respect provide they respect the Court.
Prosecutor
3/10/26
Litigant
2/23/26
If found this to be man unfair and unjust. However, who am I to judge him, I wish him the best in this world, but know that one day you will be before the true Judge Mr. Walter's. While I wholeheartedly feel you made an injustice in my case, I cannot and will not judge you sir. Best Wishes,
Litigant
2/23/26
I have had settlement conferences with most of DConn’s USMJ and all have been polite and helpful. Judge Merriam was neither. She was rude to me, my client, opposing counsel, and his client. She would interrupt us and say things like “Well that’s not how it’s done with me” and “My courtroom, my rules.” Haughty. Abrupt. My conference with her was about 8 or10 years ago, but I’m posting this now (Jan 2026) because of recent press about her berating and belittling her clerks. Based on how she acted during my conference with her, I was not surprised to read these allegations.
Civil Litigation - Private
1/2/26
Case Observed:
United States v. Jason Cardiff
Case No. 5:23-cr-00021-JGB
United States District Court, Central District of California
This commentary is offered from the perspective of a member of the federal judiciary and is grounded in a single premise: adjudication must be anchored exclusively in law. Personal views of the parties, institutional sympathies, reputational considerations, or perceived equities external to the record have no legitimate place in judicial decision making. The role of the court is to apply governing law to established facts, faithfully and without reservation. Where structural or jurisdictional defects are credibly raised, they must be addressed directly, irrespective of consequence.
The present prosecution did not arise in isolation. It followed an earlier civil enforcement action brought by the Federal Trade Commission against Jason Cardiff, over which Judge Dolly M. Gee presided. In that civil matter, the Government alleged deficiencies relating to clinical substantiation and sought substantial monetary relief. Following the Supreme Court’s decision in AMG Capital Management, which clarified the limits of the FTC’s remedial authority, the civil case concluded without the relief initially sought, and control of the underlying business was returned to Mr. Cardiff pursuant to court order. Mr. Cardiff thereafter relocated abroad with court authorization, and for a period the matter appeared resolved in the ordinary course. The subsequent initiation of criminal proceedings, arising from substantially overlapping factual terrain, provides necessary context for understanding the procedural sensitivities now presented.
As a member of this narrow and collegial judicial fraternity, I periodically consult The Robing Room to understand how judicial conduct is perceived by the bar and by litigants. I do so not for commentary on personalities, but as a matter of institutional stewardship. Public confidence in the judiciary depends not merely upon outcomes, but upon visible adherence to first principles. Structural regularity, procedural fidelity, and respect for the limits of judicial and prosecutorial authority are indispensable to the rule of law.
I have followed the proceedings in United States v. Jason Cardiff with sustained and deliberate attention. Having reviewed the docket in full and examined the filings sequentially, as one would when assuming responsibility for a matter midstream, I can state candidly that it is rare to encounter a federal criminal case presenting such a concentration of unresolved threshold issues. The record reflects not a single aberration, but a series of foundational questions that remain outstanding.
The defendant has filed 6 motions to dismiss. Of these, at least 4 present substantial legal questions, and no fewer than 3 would, in my judgment, have warranted dismissal had they been presented to me. These motions are neither dilatory nor rhetorical. They are carefully framed, legally grounded, and directed at defects that ordinarily would be resolved at the outset of criminal proceedings. They implicate jurisdiction, authority, due process, and the lawful invocation of the sovereign’s prosecutorial power.
During the recent holiday recess, I revisited the docket and encountered a development of particular significance: the filing of a motion to strike. Such motions are uncommon in criminal practice and are often disfavored. Here, however, the motion is not collateral in nature. It is directed at a question antecedent to all others: whether the United States is lawfully represented in this prosecution.
The motion alleges, and the docket appears to corroborate, that the case has proceeded for an extended period without a duly appointed Assistant United States Attorney and, more strikingly, without a sitting United States Attorney for approximately 6 months. According to the record, the only individual purporting to act on behalf of the Government is a Department of Justice trial attorney from Washington, D.C., whose authority to prosecute this matter has not been established by any disclosed statutory delegation, appointment order, or written authorization filed with the court.
If accurate, this defect is not technical, incidental, or subject to harmless error analysis. It is jurisdictional in character. Acts taken ultra vires by an unauthorized representative of the sovereign are void ab initio. Proceedings conducted coram non judice cannot be cured by waiver, acquiescence, considerations of efficiency, or post hoc ratification. Authority must exist at the moment prosecutorial power is exercised.
To my knowledge, this posture is without precedent in modern federal criminal practice. I am unaware of any other federal prosecution that has proceeded for a sustained period in the absence of a United States Attorney, an Assistant United States Attorney of record, or a disclosed and valid statutory delegation authorizing a Department of Justice trial attorney to act in their stead. While courts occasionally encounter brief transitional gaps, the continuation of a criminal prosecution under these circumstances appears sui generis and presents questions of first impression concerning the limits of institutional tolerance for defects in prosecutorial authority.
What is taught at the outset of judicial service is unequivocal. Before addressing the merits of any dispute, before exercising discretion, and before ruling on any motion, the court must ascertain who appears before it and whether those persons possess lawful authority to do so. Identification of the prosecutor and confirmation of proper appointment and delegation are not procedural formalities. They are a sine qua non of criminal adjudication and a core safeguard of separation of powers.
Against this backdrop, it is difficult to avoid the question of how such a defect persisted unaddressed. How did a federal criminal case proceed for months without an AUSA of record? How were filings accepted and rulings issued without first resolving whether the United States was lawfully represented at all? These are matters ordinarily resolved sua sponte and at the threshold, precisely because they implicate the court’s own jurisdiction and institutional legitimacy.
These concerns are amplified by the presence of a fully developed fraud on the court motion supported by documentary evidence and sworn declarations, to which the Government has offered no substantive rebuttal on the issue of fraud itself. Fraud on the court is not an ordinary factual dispute between adversaries. It is an injury to the judicial process and is addressed through the court’s inherent authority to protect the integrity of its proceedings and records.
The decision to characterize such fraud as a matter for jury determination, rather than as a judicial question antecedent to trial, is highly unusual. Fraud on the court is not merely fraud inter partes; it is fraud directed at the tribunal. Deferring that determination raises serious institutional questions concerning the allocation of judicial responsibility and the court’s role as guardian of its own processes.
I offer no opinion on the ultimate disposition of this matter. That responsibility rests solely with Judge Bernal, and I do not minimize the difficulty of presiding over a case presenting this degree of procedural complexity. I note only that this case is being closely observed by those who understand, perhaps more acutely than most, what it means to occupy the federal bench. When unresolved questions of prosecutorial authority, prima facie fraud on the court, and jurisdictional infirmities converge in a single prosecution, the judiciary’s duty to address them decisively is at its zenith.
This case is no longer merely about a defendant or a single prosecution. It implicates the court’s obligation to ensure that the sovereign itself appears lawfully and that judicial power is exercised only within the bounds prescribed by law. How these issues are resolved will resonate well beyond this docket and will speak directly to the judiciary’s enduring role as guardian of its own legitim
Court Staff
12/31/25
my so call Judge George Caram Steeh has Parkinson disease 5 years plus.(see) Douglas J. Johnson v. East Tawas Housing Commission case no. 21-10437 They hack my cell and computer.
Litigant
12/26/25
Other
12/10/25
Did an excellent job of achieving settlement in a case with an erratic plaintiff where multiple efforts had failed before. Was well-versed in the nuances of the case, exhibited the patience of Job, and devoted the better part of a day to resolving the matter. I would definitely use her again for settlement.
Hon. Sarah Netburn
This Judge was a pleasure to deal with in settlement. Settled our futures contract case in less than two hours. Smart, practical, and a great sense of humor. Consent to have all cases to which he is assigned heard exclusively by him. He is that good.
Hon. Daniel G. Martin
Judge Hudspeth is one of the finest judges that I have ever been in front of. When he sets a case for trial, he means it; it is going to happen that day. In the jury trial that I handled before him, he paid close attention, was polite and moved us along at good clip. He took extensive notes, was sharp on evidence issues and decisive in his rulings. Judge Hudspeth even drafted the jury instructions and verdict form prior to our charge conference. I was blown away by how into it he was. I hope that I get the chance to try another case in front of him.
Hon. Harry Lee Hudspeth
This judge excells in all areas of his work.
Hon. Thomas B. Russell
You sure are going to have to provide more detail than that to convince me you have a legitimate complaint. I have not seen her on the federal bench, but she was as good as they come on the State Bench, and I doubt she has changed. Even if she made a mistake, there are mistakes and there are mistakes. There are mis-citations and there are mis-citations. There are differences of opinions and there are black and white wrongs. I don't think your comment is due any weight at all. My biggest fear for her is that the system will corrupt her. The federal law is ugly in many respects, and I think it would be hard to remain good in view of such an ugly environment.
Hon. Nelva Gonzales Ramos
Judge Hudspeth is one of the finest judges that I have ever been in front of. When he sets a case for trial, he means it; it is going to happen that day. In the jury trial that I handled before him, he paid close attention, was polite and moved us along at good clip. He took extensive notes, was sharp on evidence issues and decisive in his rulings. Judge Hudspeth even drafted the jury instructions and verdict form prior to our charge conference. I was blown away by how into it he was. I hope that I get the chance to try another case in front of him.
Hon. Harry Lee Hudspeth
I have handled cases representing both plaintiffs and defendants in front of Judge Hughes, and I have not found him to be biased in favor of one side or the other. What Judge Hughes expects, though, is for attorneys who appear before him to be familiar with the facts of their cases and to be prepared to intelligently discuss both the facts and the law of their claims and/or defenses. Judge Hughes does seem to have a tendency to make up his mind early in a case, but I find that his opinion is based on his view of the viability of the claims and defenses, and is not strictly a bias in favor of the defense, as stated by many commenters.
Hon. Lynn N. Hughes
If only we had more judges like Judge Sweet. He is smart as a whip, fair, even-handed and courteous. He is one of the last and greatest 'gentleman judges.' I have been before him multiple times, over a 25-year period, and he is outstanding. I haven't always won, but I have always been treated fairly, and my cases have always been given proper consideration.
Hon. Robert W. Sweet
This judge is very intelligent, with the best, most down-to-earth temperament of any judge that I have ever encountered. He actually welcomes the lawyers ahead of time in chambers, and shakes everyone's hand. I admire temperament more than I do ideology in a judge.
Hon. N. Randy Smith
Judge Fitzsimmons has repeatedly settled complex employment cases for me in a very even-handed and kind way. At one point, she sat for over 40 minutes and allowed a distraught plaintiff to describe in horrible detail what had happened. She was calm, supportive, and effective in bringing the parties together. I've had decisions from her go against me, but they have been well-reasoned and fair.
Hon. Holly B. Fitzsimmons (Recalled)
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