THE ROBING ROOM

Another doosey by Judge Pauley suppresion of 230 kg of cocaine; easily reversed by 2nd circuit. Simply amazing the way this judge rules most times. 09-1144, US - v.- NAVAS, ALVAREZ, and MOREL The district court held that a warrantless search of the trailer ran afoul of the Fourth Amendment. On appeal, defendants liken the trailer to a fixed structure, and argue that the district court properly suppressed the fruits of the search. The government argues that, whether or not attached to a cab, the trailer is subject to a warrantless search pursuant to the “automobile exception” to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. As the trailer was readily mobile and commanded only a diminished expectation of privacy, we hold that the automobile exception applies. Therefore, we reverse. Following Morel’s consent, the agents entered the warehouse and conducted the search at issue in this appeal. Acting on information from Navas’s post-arrest statement and the cooperating witness, they examined the top of the trailer and observed physical indicia of a secret compartment. The agents then “ripped off the sheet metal roof” of the trailer, discovered 230 kilograms of cocaine, and promptly seized the contraband. The district court held that the search of the trailer in the warehouse violated the Fourth Amendment. It began by rejecting the government’s argument that Morel’s consent was sufficient to permit the search. The district court found it “undisputed that Morel verbally consented to a general search of the warehouse,” but concluded that his consent did not extend to a physically invasive search. In addition to defendants-appellees’ arguments relating to the automobile exception, Alvarez separately argues that we may affirm the district court based on the alternative ground that “the search of the warehouse was performed . . . without consent.” Because this assertion ignores the district court’s ruling that Morel consented to a general search of the warehouse, we reject it. Therefore, the court held, the warrantless search of the trailer was not justified by the consent doctrine. The court held that the exception was inapplicable because “[a]stationary trailer, detached from a tractor cab with its legs dropped, and stored inside a warehouse, is not a vehicle that is readily mobile or in use for transportation. Consequently, we are left with a straightforward legal question: Is the warrantless search of a trailer that is unhitched from its cab permissible under the automobile exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement? We hold that the exception applies. The district court reasoning that it was “hard to imagine a scenario where the [trailer] could have been hooked up to a cab” because defendants were under arrest. 2nd circuit appeals court ruled the suppression of evidence reversed.